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I. INTRODUCTION
The sale of proprietorship, partnership interest, or stock in a closely
held corporation, when accompanied by a covenant not to compete by
the vendor, has resulted in a constant source of tax litigation concerning
the proper treatment to be accorded the covenant by both the vendor
and vendee.' Various criteria involving both procedural and substantive
factors have been given differing degrees of weight in deciding the basi-
cally factual issue2 of whether the covenant has an ascertainable value
independent from the good will3 transferred with the business.
Consideration of the tests developed by the courts and evaluation of
the merits of these tests is intended to provide a more comprehensive
view of the case law as it exists today.
* Member of the Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review.
1. The courts have attempted to distinguish between a sale of the proprietorship or
partnership wherein the vendor is said to have a direct proprietory right in the good will
as opposed to the sale of stock by a shareholder who purportedly has no good will to
transfer since it is an asset of the corporation. E.g., Beal's Estate v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d
268 (2d Cir. 1936); Salvage v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1935), aff'd, 297 U.S.
106 (1936); Richard Ullman, 29 T:C. 129 (1957); Balthrope v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 28
(5th Cir. 1966). The validity of this distinction is discussed under the Shareholders as
Covenantors section of this paper.
2. Annabelle Candy Co. v. Commissioner, 314 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1962) (whether the
parties intended to allocate a part of the purchase price to the covenant); Schulz v. Com-
missioner, 294 F.2d 52 (9th 'Cir. 1961) (the covenant had no basis in economic reality).
Further attention is later given to the implications of the issue being primarily factual (in
that the basic evidentiary facts were in dispute at trial level).
3. One of the best known definitions of good will is that of Justice Story:
This good will may be properly enough described to be the advantage or benefit,
which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere value of the capital,
stock, funds, or property employed therein, in consequence of the general public
patronage and encouragement, which it receives from constant or habitual cus-
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II. TAX CONSEQUENCES TO VENDOR AND VENDEE
In covenanting not to compete with the vendee pursuant to the sale
of the vendor's property, including good will,4 the vendor in effect sur-
renders his right to earn income by promising not to engage in a similar
business within certain territorial limits.5 Any consideration received
for this promise as a distinct and separable amount from the sale of the
other assets is characteristically as much ordinary income as compen-
sation for the affirmative act of rendition of personal services.'
It is evident, therefore, that the vendor's tax liability is greatly
increased by being forced to report the consideration received for the
covenant as ordinary income.' However, if the total consideration in
excess of tangible and specific intangible assets is deemed to be received
for good will, with the covenant not to compete merely assuring the
vendee the beneficial enjoyment of the good will8 which he has acquired,
the gain therefrom is accorded favorable capital gain treatment. If the
tomers, on account of its local position, or common celebrity, or reputation for
skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances or neces-
sities or even from ancient partialities, or prejudices.
STORY, PARTNERSHIPS § 99, at 158 (5th ed. 1859).
4. As shown by the definition in note 3 supra, good will includes favorable customer
attitudes, customer lists, and location. Thus, in Estate of Masquelette v. Commissioner,
239 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1956), it was not necessary for the contract of sale to include the
words "good will" since in fact the transfer enabled the purchaser to "step into the shoes
of the seller." See also Barran v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1964).
5. The enforceability under the common law of a noncompetition agreement depends
among other things upon the fact that the territory which it embraces shall be no greater
than is reasonably necessary to secure the protection of the business or good will. See 9
A.L.R. 1468 (1920) for the general rule. Also in Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255
N.C. 244, 247, 120 S.E.2d 739, 742 (1961) the court stated:
Where the territory embraced in restrictive covenants is unreasonable, but is ex-
pressed in divisible terms, i.e., in terms of local geographical or governmental units,
the majority of the courts enforce the covenant in as many of the units as are
reasonable and disregard the remainder.
6. The early cases set the precedent which has since been followed. E.g., Cox v. Hel-
vering, 71 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1934) ; Christensen Mach. Co., 18 B.T.A. 256 (1929); Black
River Sand Corp., 18 B.T.A 490 (1929); Hamlin's Trust v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761
(10th Cir. 1954); 3B MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22.33 (rev. ed. 1966). Since
there must be an exchange of "property" for capital gain treatment to be allowable, it
has been contended that the covenant given by the seller as an integral part of the sale
is in effect a conveyance of property. When faced with this contention the Second Circuit
reasoned that even if the privilege of the vendor to engage in business is a right of property
to him, such property was not conveyed to the vendee. The vendee could not acquire the
vendor's privilege, all it received was his promise not to exercise his privilege. Payment
received for such a promise was therefore held to be ordinary income and not proceeds
received from sale of a capital asset. Beal's Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 1, citing
Salvage v. Commissioner, supra note 1.
7. For the maximum tax rate for individuals for taxable years beginning after December
31, 1964, see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1. The maximum effective capital gain rate is 25%.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1201.
8. The generally accepted test for covenants is whether "the covenant is so closely
related to a sale of good will that it fails to have any independent significance apart from
merely assuring the effective transfer of that good will." Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d
305, 307 (2d Cir. 1959); see also Aaron Michaels, 12 T.C. 17 (1949).
9. See note 7 supra.
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covenant is deemed to be merely ancillary to the enjoyment of the ac-
quired good will, no deduction in the form of depreciation or amortiza-
tion is available to the vendee. 10
However, if the covenant has separate value (thus requiring the
vendor to report the proceeds received for it as ordinary income) and
it has a specified life," the vendee will be entitled to amortize its cost
over the period during which the vendor has promised to refrain from
competition.' 2
The amortization allowance is by no means guaranteed as a neces-
sary corollary to ordinary income treatment to the vendor. Amortization
has not been allowed where the benefits of elimination of competition
were permanent or of indefinite3 duration. The early cases which denied
amortization on this basis guided covenantees in later transactions so
that restraints from competition for a specified term of years were pro-
vided for contractually.' 4
.It is most probable, however, that the income-producing or economic
benefits to be derived by the covenantee who has acquired the good will
of the covenantor-vendor will continue long past the period fixed by
the sales agreement.' 5 Although the covenant not to compete could then
be said to be of use in the production of income for an indefinite period
and consequently not subject to depreciation,' 6 this rationale has never
been advanced by the Commissioner.
Due to the above-described conflicting tax consequences it is obvious
that the interests of the vendor and vendee are antithetical in negotiating
the amount which is to be paid for the covenant not to compete.' Assum-
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956).
11. As to the allowance of amortization, the necessity for a limited period is a require-
ment imposed by Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956) and is well supported by prior decisions.
E.g., Christensen Mach. Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 149, 50 F.2d 282 (1931); Toledo
Newspaper Co., 2 T.C. 794 (1943); News Leader Co., 18 B.T.A. 1212 (1930).
12. The courts have been uniform in allowing the cost of a covenant not to compete
to be amortized over the promised period of restraint from competition as stipulated in
the contract of sale. See note 11 supra.
13. In Clark Thread Co., 28 B.T.A. 1128 (1933), a competitor was paid $500,000 to
discontinue the sale of thread under a competitive trade name. The contract did not specify
a definite period of restraint. Due to the indefinite life, amortization of the $500,000 was
disallowed. See also Press Publishing Co., 17 B.T.A. 452, 56 F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 1932), aff'd
sub. nom.
14. As a result, there has been no litigation on this point in recent years.
15. See 8 TAx. L. REV. 236 (1952-1953). The vendee-covenantee can develop customer
attachments that are not impaired when the covenantor returns to competition. These
attachments may last, therefore, as long as the business. See generally CHAMBERLAI&, THE
T"EORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (8th ed. 1962).
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956) provides in part:
If an intangible asset is known from experience or other factors to be of use in
the business or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length
of which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may
be the subject of a depreciation allowance.
17. The vendor, being motivated by a desire for more capital gain and less ordinary
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ing the tax sophistication" of both parties, the tax consequences should
be theoretically reflected in the final purchase price of the business.
It would seem that the contrasting results to the parties' tax lia-
bilities would serve to mitigate the Treasury's hazard of loss of revenue. 9
This could be a substantially valid hypothesis if the parties treated the
good will and/or covenant transferred pursuant to the sale in a con-
sistent manner for tax purposes.
This is frequently not the case, however, since many vendors, after
agreeing to a contractual allocation of a specific amount of the sales
price to the covenant, will thereafter report the entire amount as capital
gain.2° Since the vendee has most certainly relied upon the contractual
allocation and claimed depreciation deductions for the acquired cov-
enant, the government may often challenge the vendor's position just
so the court can resolve the inconsistency.2'
Since loss of revenue to the Treasury is apparently due to this incon-
sistency, litigation on this issue has been, and will continue to be, neces-
sarily resorted to by the Commissioner. 2
income, will press for a low price for the covenant and a large amount for good will.
The reverse is sought by the vendee seeking larger deductions for amortization of the
covenant.
18. Occasionally the courts have relied upon the covenantor's awareness of the tax
consequences as indicative of whether there was arm's length bargaining for the covenant.
See Schulz v. Commissioner, supra note 2 (lack of vendor's knowledge of tax consequences
a factor in finding the covenant to be a sham); Yandell v. United States, 315 F.2d 141
(9th Cir. 1963) (the covenant was found not to be a sham, one factor being the vendor's
representation by counsel when the agreements were prepared) ; Balthrope v. Commissioner,
supra note 1 (vendor's accountant being present during negotiations negated vendor's al-
leged ignorance of unfavorable tax consequences attributable to the covenant).
19. This practical consideration is mentioned in 3B MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§ 22.33, at 149 (rev. ed. 1966). Disregarding tax rate differentials between vendor and
vendee, ordinary income treatment to the vendor and amortization deductions allowed to
the vendee would result in the maximum equalization of tax revenue. Capital gain treatment
to the vendor, however, results in an immediate increase in tax revenue, whereas the conse-
quent nonamortizable good will, which must be carried by the vendee, may never serve
to reduce the vendee's tax liability.
20. See, e.g., Federal Oil Co., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1966-195, Docket No. 5466-64, Aug.
31, 1966; Balthrope v. Commissioner, supra note 1; Montesi v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 97
(6th Cir. 1965); Barran v. Commissioner, supra note 4; Louis A. Klitzner, 23 CCH Tax. Ct.
Mem. 466 (1964), aff'd, 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9341. The above cases all involved contractual
allocations of specified amounts paid for the agreement not to compete. The vendors in
each case claimed capital gain treatment for the amounts so allocated, which was deter-
mined to be ordinary income by the courts.
21. The Commissioner has often made inconsistent determinations and the cases of the
vendor and vendee are thereafter consolidated for trial in order to afford the Tax Court
the opportunity to consider the varying versions of the transaction after one hearing. Thus
a consistent result may be reached with respect to all parties. Ray H. Schulz, 34 T.C. 235
(1960), 294 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1961), aff'd sub nom; Howard Construction Co., 43 T.C.
343 (1964); Benjamin Levenson, 45 T.C. 380 (1966).
22. An interesting case involving an action for breach of contract arose due to incon-
sistent treatment between the parties to a contract for the sale of stock in four finance
companies. The court found the plaintiff-vendor justified in concluding that both parties
intended that the sales price of the stock, $2,500,000, was to be paid for the stock alone
[VOL. XI
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III. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
The procedural problems of litigating a case before the Tax Court
or federal courts are not the main concern of this paper, but some dis-
cussion will provide a better understanding of the decisions considered
later.
A. Tax Court
The Tax Court Rules state that the burden of proof is on the peti-
tioner (taxpayer)3 The rule is well settled, however, that when the
proof shows that the Commissioner's determination was wrong, the tax-
payer need not show the exact amount of the tax that might lawfully
be assessed against him. 4
Although the Tax Court will not make findings of fact upon con-
jecture, nevertheless, its problem is sometimes making the "closest ap-
proximation" it can.25 This approach has evolved from the well-known
"Cohan rule" which has been applied by the Tax Court to arrive at a
fair approximation in determining amounts of deductions allowable to
taxpayers when the evidence falls short of proving exact allowances.26
This "rule," which had its origin in deduction cases, has been extended
to good will versus covenant controversies.2
The application of the "Cohan rule" to covenant cases is perhaps
and for nothing else since there was no contractual allocation to the covenant not to
compete. The Internal Revenue Service disallowed capital gain treatment to the vendor
because:
[t]he purchasers of certain of these capital stocks treated a portion of the purchase
price as a payment for covenants not to compete . . . thus creating an incon-
sistency in the position taken regarding the sale between the purchaser and the
seller.
Stern & Co. v. State Loan & Fin. Corp., 238 F. Supp. 901, 915 (D. Del. 1965).
The court concluded that the vendee breached an agreement that the vendor was to
receive the entire purchase price solely for this stock, and thereby held the vendee liable
for attorneys' fees incurred by the vendor in successfully contesting the deficiency asserted
against it due to the vendee's allocation. The court stated:
Defendant should have known that its contention that a part of the money paid
to plaintiff represented the cost of the covenant not to compete, was irreconcilable
with plaintiff's treatment of the entire consideration as the sales price of the
stock; and that the allowance of the tax benefits which defendants sought would,
in all likelihood, result in the disallowance of the capital gains benefits to plaintiff.
Id. at 915.
23. TAx CT. R. 32.
24. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507 (1935); Grubb v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 753
(6th Cir. 1963); Federal Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1950).
25. Levine v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1963).
26. In Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930), it was held that in the
absence of detached accounts of travel and entertainment expenses, the Board of Tax
Appeals must make as close an approximation as it can, bearing heavily, if it chooses, upon
the taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his own making.
27. E.g., John T. Fletcher, P-H Tax. Ct. Mem. 1965-273 (a deduction case in which
the court allocated 45% to the covenant, 45% to insurance expirations, and 10% to good
will); Melvon C. Miller, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1964-305 (court allocated 50% to the covenant
and 50% to good will); Levine v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d 298 (3d Cir. 1963) (another
50/50 allocation).
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the greatest advantage a taxpayer, contesting such an issue, can gain
by choosing the Tax Court as the forum rather than the federal district
courts." In M. Levine29 the taxpayer sold a fuel oil business for 85,000
dollars. In negotiations leading up to the sale no separate consideration
was stated for good will or for a covenant not to compete for 7 years,
but the sales agreement recited the buyer's allocation of 35,000 dollars
of the 85,000 dollar sale to "restrictive covenants." The Commissioner
asserted a deficiency against the seller by considering the entire 35,000
dollars to represent ordinary income received in consideration of the
covenant rather than for good will as contended by the seller. The Tax
Court found both the good will and the covenant to have value. The
Third Circuit,"° in affirming the Tax Court's allocation of 50 per cent
of the 35,000 dollars to each element, concluded that to allow nothing
for the good will or for the covenant or both would have been incon-
sistent with the evidence. At the same time one hundred per cent accu-
racy in fixing the respective amounts was impossible.
The Tax Court's willingness to find some mid-ground which is fair
to both the taxpayer and the Commissioner in this difficult area of evalu-
ation is to be contrasted with the approach to the burden of proof prob-
lem in the federal district courts.
B. Federal District Courts
Similar to the rule as to presentation of evidence before the Tax
Court, in the district courts the findings of the Commissioner as to value
and other facts are presumptively correct and the burden of overcoming
them rests upon the taxpayer suing3" to recover alleged excessive tax pay-
ments.3 2 However, there is a somewhat greater burden of proof upon
the taxpayer in a refund suit than in a Tax Court proceeding.3
Since the action for refund of taxes is in the nature of a common
law action for money had and received and is governed by equitable
principles, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to prove not only that
the Commissioner's determination was wrong, or that the claim for re-
fund is reasonable, 34 but to produce evidence from which another and
proper determination could be made.3
28. See note 35 infra.
29. 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 363 (1962).
30. 324 F.2d 298 (3d Cir. 1963).
31. Prior to bringing suit in a federal district court or Court of Claims, a claim for
refund must first be filed. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7422. Thereafter a suit may not be
brought before the expiration of 6 months from the date of filing the claim unless the
Secretary or his delegate (District Director) renders a decision within that time. INT. R V.
CODE OF 1954, § 6532(a)(1).
32. David v. Phinney, 350 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1965); Renstrom v. United States, 220
F. Supp. 688 (D. Neb. 1963); Metcalf v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 288 (1st Cir. 1959).
33. Commissioner v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co, 260 F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1958).
34. Dairy Home Co. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 92 (D. Minn. 1960).
35. United States v. Pfister, 205 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1953). The Supreme Court has
stated by way of dictum that in an action to recover taxes paid:
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The pitfalls awaiting a taxpayer engaged in a contest over the proper
tax treatment of a covenant in a district court are aptly illustrated by
the Fifth Circuit decision in David v. Phinney.3 6
In that case the taxpayer sold a fifty per cent interest in a corpo-
ration along with a covenant not to compete for a 500,000 dollar lump
sum. The other fifty per cent stockholder, a corporation, sold its stock
for 333,000 dollars. The Commissioner determined that 166,000 dollars
of the amount received by the taxpayer should be accorded ordinary
income treatment. The only evidence concerning the amount paid for
the covenant was the taxpayer's testimony that he was paid nothing
for it.
The district court37 upheld the Commissioner's determination of
166,000 dollars attributable to ordinary income as being presumptively
correct. The Fifth Circuit 38 grounded its affirmance on the taxpayer's
failure to offer any credible evidence from which any other determina-
tion of his federal income tax liability could be made.
In effect, the taxpayer lost because he could not prove exactly how
much was attributable to the covenant. Obviously, this is virtually im-
possible since the parties themselves did not arrive at a precise allo-
cation. Thus this case demonstrates that what is euphemistically called
a "presumption" of correctness develops into an "absolute" to sustain
the Commissioner's implied finding in a deficiency determination.
39
Due to the inherent difficulties in meeting the burden of proof in
covenant cases in the federal district court, it is not surprising that the
great majority of such cases have been tried by taxpayers in the Tax
Court where a more liberal standard is applied in allocating between
covenants and good will."
C. Appellate Courts
If the losing party wishes to appeal the decision of either the Tax
Court or a federal district court, it would be well to consider the obsta-
cles to obtaining a reversal.
Obviously the burden was on the plaintiff in order to establish a basis for judg-
ment in his favor, specifically to show not merely that the assessment was errone-
ous but also the amount to which he was entitled.
Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 514 (1935).
36. Supra note 32.
37. David v. Phinney, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9612 (1963).
38. See note 36 supra.
39. A dissenting opinion felt it would be proper to find out what a fair value to the
covenant would be. The mere fact that the taxpayer received $500,000, or $166,000 more
than the other selling stockholder, was not felt to be conclusive evidence that the entire
$166,000 was received for the covenant. The dissent stated:
How two sellers, each with different interests to serve, arrive at a price is a pre-
carious basis for determining intrinsic attribution. Maybe one just wants more
money. Maybe one thinks that the buyer will pay more.
350 F.2d at 378.
40. See note 27 supra.
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In general, the function of the appellate court is to review such
decisions in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the
district courts in civil actions tried without a jury." Review of the trial
court's decision is governed by the rule that findings of fact shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous and due regard shall be given to the
trial court's ability to determine the credibility of the witnesses.12
Questions of motive, intent, and the like, if at all doubtful, are
ordinarily issues of fact, and where inconsistent inferences may rea-
sonably be drawn from evidence in regard thereto, it is for the trial
court to determine what inference shall be drawn.43 The factual issue
has been phrased in covenant versus good will cases as whether: (1) the
agreement not to compete was actually dealt with as a separate item;
44
(2) the parties bargained for the agreement not to compete in good
faith; 41 (3) the covenants were realistically bargained for; 46 (4) the
payments, which were allocated to the covenant, were in fact payments
for something else;" and (5) the covenant has such a relationship with
business reality that reasonable men, genuinely concerned with their
own economic future, might bargain for the agreement. 8
Since the heart of the issue is determining the real intent of the
parties and therefore searching for the substance of the transaction
rather than the form,4 9 the "clearly erroneous" rule severely confines the
appellate courts in their review." Although the cases appealed on this
issue have been plentiful, only an incorrigible optimist would believe a
reversal of the trial court could be achieved in light of the above rule.5 '
The only realistic possibility of obtaining a reversal, then, would
seem to be through the trial court committing an error of law where
the facts are undisputed.52
41. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7482(a).
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
43. See, e.g., Howell v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 428 (3d Cir. 1964); Kessmar Constr.
Co. v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1964); Levine v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d 298
(3d Cir. 1963).
44. Gazette Tel. Co., 19 T.C. 692 (1953), aff'd, 209 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954) ; Howard
Construction Co., 43 T.C. 343 (1964).
45. Dairy Serv., Inc., T.C. Memo. 1966-113. Andrew A. Monaghan, 40 T.C. 680 (1963).
46. Carl L. Danielson, 44 TC. 549 (1965).
47. Barran v. Commissioner, supra note 4; Balthrope v. Commissioner, supra note 1.
48. Schulz v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Annabelle Candy Co. v. Com-
missioner, 314 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1962).
49. In Carl L. Danielson, 44 T.C. 549 (1965). See also Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465 (1935) ; Hamlin's Trust v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954).
50. The rule has been stated by most of the appellate courts as the standard by which
the trial court's findings have been reviewed. See, e.g., Montesi v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d
97 (6th Cir. 1965) ; Yandell v. United States, 315 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Commissioner
v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1963).
51. The Second Circuit has stated that the "clearly erroneous" doctrine, if carried to
its logical conclusion, would eliminate any appellate review. Seven Canal Place Corp. v.
Commissioner, 332 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1964).
52. Where there is no dispute as to the basic evidentiary facts and nothing remains
[VOL. XXI
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In exceptional situations, both the Fifth53 and Seventh Circuits54
have reversed the Tax Court for having made erroneous decisions of
law. Both cases involved undisputed oral testimony and erroneous as-
sumptions of law55 which when coupled with the appellate courts' own
interpretations of the written contracts resulted in reversals.
Since this type of error at the trial court level has been uncommon
in the covenant area it seems safe to say that when the battle has been
lost at that level, so too has the war.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE TESTS CONSIDERED
A. Contractual Allocation to Covenant
Generally, the courts are not bound by the form in which parties
to an agreement clothe their transaction but are charged with the duty
of determining the realities of the transaction after having considered
all the pertinent facts.56 However, the cases which have contributed to
the jurisprudence in this area seem to hold that where the parties bar-
gain at arm's length over the terminology to be used in expressing an
agreement not to compete and conclude with a separately stated con-
sideration for the forbearance from competition, this amounts to an
implied bargain between them that the seller, covenantor, will assume
the unfavorable tax consequences flowing from the receipt of the con-
sideration and the purchaser will obtain the corresponding benefits.5
Accordingly, when faced with sales agreements wherein specific
values have been assigned to the covenant not to compete, the great
but for the trial court to apply the process of reasoning to achieve a correct interpretation
of the legal significance of the evidentiary facts, such conclusion as the trial court reaches
as an "ultimate fact" is subject to review, not as a review of a finding of fact, but free
from the restraint of the "clearly erroneous" rule. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Commissioner, 223
F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Fahs v. Taylor, 239 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Estate of Mas-
quelette v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1956).
53. Estate of Masquelette v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1956), reversing,
14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 879 (1955).
54. Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1955),
reversing, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 913 (1954).
55. In Masquelette, the Tax Court stressed the omission of the words "good will" from
the contract of sale in allocating the entire consideration over and above that received for
tangible assets to a covenant not to compete. As a matter of law, the words "good will"
were not considered necessary by the Fifth Circuit if in fact the transfer enabled the pur-
chaser to "step into the shoes of the seller." See note 53 supra at 325.
In the Wilson case the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the Tax Court's thinking that
absent an express segregation of the purchase price to an amount specified for a covenant,
no value could be attributed to the covenant for amortization purposes by the buyer. In
view of the silence of the contract in this respect, it then became necessary to determine
from the other evidence whether the covenant had value, and if so the amount. See note
54 supra.
56. See note 49 supra.
57. See Yandell v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 306 (Ore. 1963), aff'd per curiam, 315
F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1963); Barran v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1964); Rogers
v. United States, 290 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1961).
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majority of courts have, upon various rationales, held the seller to the
bargain which he made and determined ordinary income treatment for
the specified amount.58
The generally accepted test for covenants is whether "the covenant
is so closely related to a sale of good will that it fails to have any inde-
pendent significance apart from merely assuring the effective transfer of
that good will."5 9 The crux of the problem is the inherent difficulty, if
not impossibility, in determining whether the covenant had a value inde-
pendent of the good will. Were it not for the good will transferred it
might be stated that the covenant itself was valueless, since it was the
sale of the business, with its good will, which generated the need for the
covenant in the first place. Indeed, at the common law, any covenant
not to compete must to some degree protect the reputation and customer
loyalty transferred with the good will of the business or it would be held
to be unenforceable.6
0
Equally true, however, is the fact that should the vendor engage in
a competing business shortly after the sale, the value of the good will
purchased pursuant to the transfer of the business would be soon
destroyed."
Because of this interrelation between the good will and the covenant
not to compete, the courts have placed great weight upon the contractual
terms agreed to by the parties themselves. The fact that tax consider-
ations admittedly played a part in determining the amount of the pur-
chase price allocated to a covenant not to compete has not contaminated
the transaction as long as the covenant was separately bargained for and
could not be considered a sham.2
58. For ordinary income treatment where the property sold was either partnership
interest or a proprietorship: Louis A. Klitzner, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 466 (1964), aff'd,
66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9341; Barran v. Commissioner, supra note 57; Yandell v. United States,
supra note 57.
For similar treatment where the property sold was either corporate assets or stock
and the covenantor was the selling stockholder or principal officer in the corporation: Beals'
Estate v. -Commissioner, 82 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1936) ; Hamlin's Trust v. Commissioner,
supra note 49; Howard G. Mathews, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1565 (1961), aff'd per curiam,
311 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1963); Montesi v. Commissioner, supra note 50; Balthrope v. Com-
missioner, 356 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Puhering & Co., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 466 (1964) ;
B. Leihtman, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1745 (1964); Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U.S. 106 (1936).
59. Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305, 307-08 (2d Cir. 1959).
60. CORBIN, CONTRAcTs § 1387 (rev. ed. 1962).
61. Prevailing authority at the common law will not permit a vendor to destroy the
value of good will by directly canvassing the old customers, endeavoring to dissuade them
from dealing with the purchaser of the good will, and soliciting them to trade with the
vendor. However, absent a restrictive contract, the vendor of good will, by engaging in a
rival business, may deal with the old customers who, attracted by their knowledge, gained
by advertising or otherwise, that he is in business, choose to trade with him. See, e.g., Ranft
v. Reimers, 200 Ill. 386, 65 N.E. 720 (1902) ; Brown v. Benzinger, 118 Md. 29, 84 A. 79
(1912) ; Foss v. Roby, 195 Mass. 292, 81 N.E. 199 (1907) ; Fine v. Lawless, 139 Tenn.
160, 201 S.W. 160 (1918).
62. Schulz v. Commissioner, supra note 48; Rogers v. United States, supra note 57;
Federal Oil Co., T.C. Memo. 1966-195.
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In Rogers v. United States63 the vendors of a small loan business
at first agreed to a total stated purchase price with nothing allocated
to a covenant not to compete. However, the final sale contract provided
a specific segregation of 60,000 dollars to the covenant. The Ninth Cir-
cuit, in first finding no confusion between the parties as to what was
done, stated:
The taxpayers probably have been manuvered by their pur-
chaser into a big tax advantage. But, when in their second
option, they agreed in writing after negotiation to the assign-
ment of some $60,900 as consideration for a covenant not to
compete, the trial court could refuse to go behind the agreement
and uphold the commissioner in treating the sum as ordinary
income.6 4
The Ninth Circuit's attributing primary importance to the parties'
separately stated contractual allocation is consistent with recent decisions
in other courts of appeal.65 These courts have required strong proof to
be adduced by the vendor to overcome the contractual allocation.
At least one writer,6 and also the Commissioner (apparently weary-
ing from litigation on this issue) has advocated the adoption of a "new
rule." The proposed rule would prevent either contracting party or the
Commissioner from subsequently attacking the stated consideration in
such agreements unless fraud, duress, or undue influence existed at the
time they were signed. The Tax Court summarily rejected this "rule" in
view of its judicial responsibility of examining the substance of a trans-
action.17 It can thus be seen that the proof required to set aside the con-
tract may encompass many more factors than fraud and duress between
the parties.
1. THE STRONG PROOF REQUIREMENT
Various factors have been considered by the courts in determining
whether the vendor has met the strong burden of proof required to over-
come a specific value assigned to a covenant not to compete in the writ-
ten contract of sale. While no single factor is sufficient to overcome the
contractual allocation of the parties, the weight of several of these fac-
tors when considered together has been accepted as proving that the
63. Supra note 57.
64. Rogers v. United States, supra note 57, at 501. In choosing to leave the vendors with
their written bargain, the Ninth Circuit conveniently followed the doctrine that while third
parties may question the resolutions of parties to a contract, in the absence of fraud it is not
ordinarily open to the bargainers to do so. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941); Higgins
v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
65. E.g., Balthrope v. Commissioner, supra note 58; Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d
305 (2d Cir. 1959) ; United Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 919 (4th Cir.
1960); Montesi v. Commissioner, supra note 50; Hamlin's Trust v. Commissioner, supra
note 49.
66. 67 YALE L.J. 1261 (1958).
67. Carl L. Danielson, supra note 49.
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covenant did not reflect the substance of the agreement entered into by
the parties.
The standard used generally to make this factual determination is
whether "the covenant must have some independent basis in fact or some
arguable relationship with business reality such that reasonable men,
genuinely concerned with their economic future, might bargain for such
an agreement.""8 Thus, before the contractual provisions will be set aside,
the aggrieved vendor must prove that the covenant was nothing more
than a sham inserted in the contract for the tax advantage of the buyer.
(a) Real Bargaining for the Covenant
One critical element which must be shown by the vendor is the
lack of any realistic bargaining for the covenant by the parties. Where
it has been determined that the parties were represented by counsel and
held negotiations69 during which the covenant not to compete was men-
tioned as a material factor,7 the contractual allocations have been
upheld.
However, where the covenant was not even considered until late in
the negotiations when the vendee's attorney advised them of its tax ad-
vantages, the Ninth Circuit in Schulz v. Commissioner71 found the cov-
enant allocation was nothing but a sham.
Similarly, where the vendee unilaterally decided to allocate 152
dollars per share to a covenant just prior to closing, after having agreed
to a total consideration of 374 dollars for each share of stock in a small
loan corporation, the Tax Court found no real bargaining for the cove-
nant.72 Along with other evidence, this factor was sufficient to constitute
the strong proof required to overcome the terms of the contract.
(b) Terms of the Covenant
Occasionally, the courts have been concerned with the actual terms
of the noncompetition provision in the contract.
The vendor in a recent case attempted to show that the covenant
lacked economic reality by contending that the agreement was void and
unenforceable due to the unreasonable territorial restriction in the cove-
nant. The Tax Court rejected this argument since the question of the
covenant's enforceability in equity or the validity of the provision for
liquidated damages for its violation by the vendor had not actually
arisen.
68. Schulz v. Commissioner, supra note 48.
69. Barran v. Commissioner, supra note 57; Rogers v. United States, supra note 57;
Pickering & Co., 23 C CH Tax Ct. Mem. 466 (1964).
70. Montesi v. Commissioner, supra note 50; Yandell v. United States, supra note 57.
71. Supra note 48.
72. See note 67 supra.
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Further, the Tax Court knew of no authority for the vendor's con-
clusion that an amount paid in good faith for a covenant not to compete
should be considered as paid for good will nunc pro tunc even if the cov-
enant were probably void under the law of the state in which the agree-
ment was entered into."
It thus appears that state law considerations have a minimal impact
on the tax effect of the covenant unless evidence can prove on a sub-
jective basis that the vendee had knowledge of the probabilities of the
covenant's unenforceability and therefore would not realistically have
expected to benefit from its restrictive provisions.74
Under the terms of the covenant in C. L. Danielson75 the selling
stockholders were precluded from competing in the small loan business
as individuals; however, there was nothing to preclude the sellers from
merely incorporating a new entity, electing themselves as directors, and
hiring office personnel to conduct the business.76 The value of the cove-
nant was shown to be highly questionable due to this gaping loophole
in its restrictiveness.
The terms of the covenant in Schulz v. Commissioner77 also influ-
enced the court in disregarding the contract. The covenant was actually
valueless because it restrained the vendor from competition for the mini-
mal period of one year and extended over a one mile area only.
The careful tax-planning vendee should have little difficulty in pro-
viding for both a reasonable length of time and area to be covered by
the covenant to give it at least the indicia of genuineness. The vendees
in Schulz were most likely a bit overzealous in attempting to deduct the
consideration stated for the covenant all in one year rather than settle
for amortization over a lengthier but more reasonable period.7 s
(c) Ignorance of the Law-An Excuse?
Occasionally, the vendor-covenantor's appreciation of the tax con-
sequences has been given probative weight in determining whether there
was arm's length bargaining. 7 This test, however, is of secondary im-
portance in the ultimate determination of whether the "strong proofs"
will defeat the contractual terms.80 The Tax Court has considered the
73. Dairy Serv., Inc., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1966-113.
74. For further discussions of common law considerations see note 5 supra.
75. Supra note 49.
76. Id. at 558.
77. Supra note 48.
78. Since the vendees case was not consolidated for trial with that of the vendor, the
tax treatment accorded the covenant by the vendees is merely conjecture on the part of
the author.
79. See, e.g., Balthrope v. Commissioner, supra note 58; John W. Shleppey, 22 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 793 (1963); Montesi v. Commissioner, supra note 50.
80. In Balthrope the Fifth Circuit realized the possibility that a vendee with superior
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tax awareness of the vendor as an "iffy" question at best and one which
would not control the issue.8 ' Nevertheless, when the unwary vendor has
been rescued from his bad bargain, evidence as to his ignorance of the
tax impact has been accepted by the courts to bolster the final decision
to disregard the covenant.8 2
Conversely, where the vendor was shown to have been represented
by tax-conscious counsel during negotiations, this fact has usually spelled
instant death to his argument that the covenant was a sham.83 The Fifth
Circuit has even precluded a vendor from pleading tax ignorance where
he was not naive about tax matters generally. In Balthrope v. Commis-
sioner84 the court noted the vendor's desire to take advantage of the
installment method of reporting the gain from the sale as indicative of
his lack of naivete as to taxes. Furthermore the vendor had his accountant
review the agreement prior to closing the sale. The court refused to judi-
cially notice the vendor's lack of awareness as to ordinary income treat-
ment aspects of the covenant although his tax advice was not really com-
petent on this particular point.8" Thus, the presence of either an attorney
or accountant during final negotiations appears to charge the vendor
with implied tax sophistication and result in an ultimate finding that the
bargaining was at arm's length.
Taking into consideration that the contractual allocation of a speci-
fied amount to the covenant is usually done for tax purposes and the
importance placed on that allocation by the courts, it is evident why
the "tax awareness" test has been used frequently. Nevertheless, the
more emphasis which is placed on what is often an arbitrarily negotiated
allocation, the more important this "tax awareness" test becomes. The
relevancy of this factor to the question of a covenant's economic reality
exemplifies the extent to which the judiciary has accepted tax consider-
ations as a necessary element of value in today's society.
(d) Actual Ability of Vendor To Compete
The business acumen of the vendor has been considered in con-
junction with other tests in determining objectively whether a covenant
was truly necessary. A lack of engineering background and sales con-
tracts by the vendor (a retiring partner) in Schulz v. Commissioner 6
knowledge of the tax consequences might be able to dominate the entire negotiations so
that it could not be said that the vendor understood any of his agreements," including the
covenant. Supra note 58, at 34 (1966).
81. Gazette Tel. Co., 19 T.C. 692, 704 (1953), aff'd, 209 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954);
Anthony Rock, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 46 (1962).
82. Schulz v. Commissioner, supra note 48.
83. Louis A. Klitzner, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 466 (1964); Yandell v. United States,
supra note 57; B. Leihtman, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1745 (1964).
84. Supra note 58.
85. Id. at 34.
86. Supra note 48.
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helped convince the Court that a specific payment for a covenant was
known to be unnecessary by the vendees, the continuing partners.
Similarly, after finding other indications of a sham arrangement,
the Tax Court in C. L. Danielson7 drove the final nail into the covenant's
coffin by noting that the selling stockholders of a corporation engaged
in the small loan business were three housewives, a successful surgeon,
and a retired businessman, none of whom could or would be likely to
compete with the buyer.
The age88 and health89 of the vendor have been additional indications
that the vendee knew a covenant was not necessary for the protection
of the acquired good will.
B. No Contractual Allocation to Covenant
The absence in the sale agreement of an amount specifically assigned
to the covenant has generally resulted in the ultimate finding that the
vendor was entitled to capital gain treatment 0 or the vendee was pre-
cluded from amortization deductions.9 The rationale for this conclusion
is that since the parties did not negotiate specifically for the covenant,
they did not intend to allocate any part of the purchase price to it.9 2
The ultimate fact is then determined that the vendor did not receive
anything for the covenant as a separate item or, couched in other terms,
the covenant was not severable 3 from the good will. Since separate
values are almost impossible to formulate, this approach is workable
87. Carl L. Danielson, supra note 49.
88. M. J. Epstein, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1167 (1964) (age 74); Carl L. Danielson,
supra note 49 (age 93); Dauksch v. Busey, 125 F. Supp. 130 (1954) (vendor of insurance
business was 73 years of age).
89. Commissioner v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1963) (vendor was forced by poor
health to go to Florida and did not have to be paid to stay out of the covenatee's business
in Ohio). In Balthrope v. Commissioner, supra note 58, a vendor argued that his ill health
was one element of "strong proof" the covenant payments were in fact for stock or good
will. But the ill health did not preclude him from continuing certain business activities in
the same area for six months each year. The court contrasted this situation to that in
Killian and discounted the actual affect of the vendor's ill health on his ability to compete.
90. See, e.g., Estate of Masquelette v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1956);
J. T. Fletcher, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1489 (1965); M. C. Miller, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1888 (1964); Ethyl M. Cox, 17 T.C. 1287 (1952); Rodney B. Horton, 13 T.C. 143 (1949).
91. E.g., D & H Bagel Bakery, Inc., 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 334 (1955); Harold J.
Burke, 18 T.C. 77 (1952); R. Bryson Jones, 17 B.T.A. 1213 (1929).
92. See Andrew A. Monaghan, 40 T.C. 680, 686 (1963). The Tax Court has stated it
cannot ascribe any value to the covenant, if the parties did not place an independent value
on it. Edward A. Kenney, 37 T.C. 1161 (1962). Where the price was agreed to before the
parties thought of a covenant not to compete, no part of the consideration was allowable
to it. Merle P. Brooks, 36 T.C. 1128 (1961).
93. Statement of the question as whether the covenant is severable or nonseverable
has been criticized as not really being prohibitive of the issue. See 3B MERTENS, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION § 22.33, at 150 (rev. ed. 1966); Schulz v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 52
(9th Cir. 1961). The "severability" test has been said to ignore the relationship between
good will and a covenant.
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with the only vital evidence being the existence of some good will being
transferred.
In instances where there was a contractual allocation of a lump
sum to both good will and the covenant together, other assets being paid
for separately, the courts, finding some evidence of value in both, allo-
cated the amount on an estimated basis.94
It is noted that the enforceability of the covenant is not diminished
at common law merely because a specific amount is not paid for it. It
has long been held that the price paid for the good will of a business is
a sufficient consideration to support the vendor's covenant not to
compete. 95
Thus, it could well be contended that any negotiation relating to
the amount of the consideration to be assigned to the covenant apart
from the good will is unnecessary other than to satisfy the tax motives
of the vendee who is acquiring the good will and its protection in a
single transaction. As mentioned previously, the validity of the covenant
itself depends upon its protection of good will. 6
This view, if adopted by the judiciary, may better accomplish its
stated obligation of looking past the formalities of a transaction to the
economic realities.
C. Shareholders as Covenantors
A distinction is commonly made between sellers of proprietorships
or partnership interests and employee-stockholders who either sell their
stock or have their closely held corporation sell its assets and covenant
not to compete as part of the sale. The Tax Court has stated that the
proprietor or partner who sells his business has a direct interest in the
good will and his covenant may well be a contributing factor in the sale
of the entire business.97 On the other hand, even though the corporation
is only a legal garment worn by the stockholders to conduct business, the
covenantor-stockholders are stated to have no direct proprietory rights
in the good will owned by the corporation. Accordingly, covenants given
by them as individuals have been taxed as ordinary income, being per-
sonal promises and thus severable from the good will. 8
94. See notes 26 and 27 supra.
95. See 17 Ami. JuR. 2D Contracts § 101, at 445 (1964) and cases cited therein.
96. The Barran case, while holding the parties to their contractual allocations also
pointed out the fact that the total price paid was substantially in excess of the assets trans-
ferred. This supported the payment for the covenant as not in fact paid for the other assets.
Barran v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1964). However, the Fifth Circuit later
relied strongly on its Barran approach as to importance of the contract itself and held
the vendor to the contractual allocation notwithstanding the fact that the total purchase
price, including the contractual value of the covenant, was the minimum estimated value of
the assets. Balthrope v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1966).
97. Richard Ullman, 29 T.C. 129, 139 (1957).
98. See note 1 supra. See also Pickering & Co., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 466 (1964).
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Recent decisions have attempted to make a less formalistic distinc-
tion between the two classes of covenantors by requiring analysis of the
stockholder's actual relationship to the good will transferred by his cor-
poration rather than merely postulating that a stockholder has no good
will to sell with his covenant. 9
If the shareholders had personal contacts with the customers it
would necessitate their covenant in order to guarantee to the vendee of
the corporate stock the enjoyment of the good will. However, where
there is no personal relationship between the selling shareholders and the
customers, and such shareholders have the ability to enter into compe-
tition with the vendee, the covenant alone would have independent value.
This test is no different from that applied in proprietorship cases. While
the barrier appears to have been weakened to a great extent, this dis-
tinction has been used recently by the Fifth Circuit as a supporting
factor in finding an allocation to the covenant to be valid.' 0
When coupled with a shareholder as seller a contractual allocation
has and should continue to result in ordinary income treatment for the
consideration paid for the covenant, barring a sham situation.'
V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Since a finding of fraud, duress, or a sham situation is necessary
to overturn a contractually assigned value to a covenant, the importance
of proper representation by counsel at the negotiating table when a busi-
ness is sold is evident. The substance-seeking function of the judiciary
has been relegated to the extreme situations where the covenant's lack
of authenticity leaves little to the imagination.
Within this framework the parties are left to play the game within
very broad rules, with little further attention being paid to such impor-
tant factors as whether the actual value of the assets may equal or
exceed the total consideration received including the covenant. Having
made his bed, the tax-informed vendor must now sleep in it.
It seems evident that the allocations to covenants in the majority
of cases are made with tax purposes as the primary motive. Although
it is more practical to -hold the parties to their bargain, the following
considerations are advanced in support of the proposition that the "strong
proofs" now needed to overcome a contractual allocation should instead
be placed upon the vendee to prove that the total purchase price paid
99. Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959); Barran v. Commissioner,
supra note 96.
100. Balthrope v. Commissioner, supra note 96.
101. Shareholders have been allowed capital gain treatment where no allocation to the
covenant was made contractually without mention by the courts that shareholders lacked
direct proprietary interest in good will sold. George H. Payne, 22 T.C. 526 (1954); J. G.
Thompson, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1193 (1964).
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for both assets and the covenant not to compete exceeded the actual
value of the assets (including good will):
(1) The validity of the covenant at common law is dependent upon
its primary purpose of protecting the good will and the provision for
the covenant at time of sale is the intent to protect that good will.1"2
(2) The consideration paid for the good will has been held to sup-
port the promise of the vendor to refrain from competition, thus requir-
ing no additional amount to be specified for the covenant.
(3) The economic benefits to the covenantee from customer attach-
ments may last as long as the business even though the covenantor may
return to compete after a specified number of years. If the benefits were
then considered to run for an indefinite time, no amortization would be
allowable in any event.
Since the judiciary is lending so much weight to the form of the
transaction, this writer would suggest a legislative remedy aimed at fore-
closing inconsistent treatment of covenants and at the same time estop-
ping the vendor from asserting that he was innocently misled by a more
knowledgeable vendee when the contract was executed.
Congress could authorize use of a statement of intent, the form of
which would be devised by the Commissioner, whereby both the vendor
and vendee could stipulate that (1) the covenant's contractual value
exceeds the value of other assets sold; (2) it was negotiated without
duress and with full knowledge of the tax consequences to each party;
(3) the period of noncompetition is both reasonable and necessary under
the circumstances; and (4) both parties will treat the covenant consis-
tently or be subject to the proper penalties.
A copy of this "statement of intent" would then be filed by both
parties with their respective tax returns for the year of sale.113
This procedure would enable the contracting parties to be positive
of tax consequences. The Commissioner could also expect a more uni-
form treatment by the courts in this area.
102. In 53 Cotm.. L. REV. 660 (1953) the author felt that the covenant should always
be treated as a capital asset because in reality the covenant is a protection of the good
will that the purchaser has bargained for.
103. Both parties should sign each copy.
